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Abstract
We study the criminal court process focusing on the interaction between plea bar-
gaining and jury trials. We model plea bargaining such that a prosecutor makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer and a defendant, who is either guilty or innocent, pleads either guilty
or not guilty. If the defendant pleads not guilty, the case goes to a jury trial, which
follows a strategic voting model. Plea bargaining produces a bias in which the defendant
is less likely to be guilty if the case goes to trial, which in turn alters the jurors’ voting
behavior. Conversely, anticipated jury trial outcomes affect a prosecutor and a defen-
dant while they participate in a plea bargain. We find that the equilibrium behavior
in a court with plea bargaining and a jury trial, resembles the equilibrium behavior in
the separate jury model, though jurors may act as if they echo the prosecutor’s pref-
erence against convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty. We also compare two
voting paradigms, unanimity and non-unanimity. The unanimity rule is inferior to non-
unanimity because the ex-ante punishment delivered to the innocent or undelivered to
the guilty by unanimity rule does not vanish as the size of jury gets large.
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1 Overview
1.1 Introduction
Plea bargaining is a pre-trial stage where a defendant is allowed to plead guilty. A
defendant pleads guilty primarily in exchange for a lesser charge than he would receive
if he was convicted after a jury trial.1 Plea bargaining is so prevalent that amongst the
89.7% convicted out of 83,391 defendants in Federal Courts in 2004, 96% of them were
by pleading guilty. For felony offenses, 96% of convicted defendants pleaded guilty, which
is an increase from 87% in 1990.2 The fact that the vast majority of cases end in plea
bargaining may cause many people to believe that trials are not important.
However, such a conclusion is inaccurate; plea bargaining and jury trials closely inter-
act with each other, and the interaction plays an important role in the judicial process.
Although most cases are settled before jury trials begin, participants in plea bargains an-
ticipate possible outcomes of jury trials in the event that they fail to reach an agreement.
It might even be said that the primary role of a jury trial is allocating bargaining power
to each side during a plea bargaining. A trial is less of an end in itself than a means
∗Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA
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guidance. Luke Boosey, Kim Border, John Duggan, Federico Echenique, Matias J. Iaryczower, Jean-
Laurent Rosenthal, Matthew Shum, and Colin Stewart have made many helpful observations. Morgan
Kousser, Hannah Wei, and Caltech undergraduates at the Hixon Writing Center helped me significantly
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1In this paper, prosecutors and defendants are all referred to as male, and jurors are all referred to
as female.
2See table 4.2 in U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal
Justice Statistics, 2004.
to force negotiations.3 On the other hand, jurors’ behavior in any jury trial that does
take place hinges on the outcome of the plea bargaining. Since the incentive to plead
guilty increases if the defendant is truly guilty, cases with innocent defendants tend to
go to trial. The jury trial incorporates this selection bias in its verdict. Therefore, the
jury trial outcomes, which become a basis of pleading decisions, are indeed affected by
pleading decisions.
This paper provides a model of the criminal court process focusing on the interaction
between plea bargaining and jury trials. We model plea bargaining such that a prosecutor
makes a take-it-or-leave-it plea bargain offer and a defendant, who is either guilty or
innocent with equal probabilities, pleads either guilty or not guilty. If the defendant
pleads guilty, then the case terminates with the offered charge. Otherwise, a jury trial,
in which we acquire a framework based on the strategic voting literature, follows. During
the process, the defendant attempt to avoid punishments, jurors try to convict the guilty
and acquit the innocent, and the prosecutor tries to deliver punishments to the guilty
while minimizing the mistake of punishing the innocent.4 The effect of plea bargaining on
jury trials is obvious. When a jury trial takes place, jurors are aware that the defendants
whom they face have denied the crime by pleading not guilty. The strategic voting model
captures this awareness in terms of jurors’ prior belief about how likely a defendant
is guilty, which in turn affects jury trial outcomes. The effect of jury trials on plea
bargaining is also evident. When the prosecutor and the defendant participate in plea
bargaining, they anticipate possible outcomes of the jury trial. In their pleading decisions,
the defendant compares the plea bargain offer with possible jury trial outcomes, which
the prosecutor already took into account when making the plea bargain offer.
By influencing jurors’ belief in the proportion of the guilty defendants, plea bargaining
manipulates jurors’ voting behavior to resembles the voting behavior in the strategic
voting without plea bargaining. Yet, the jurors may echo the prosecutor’s preferences over
mistakenly delivered (or undelivered) punishments to the innocent (or the guilty). The
prosecutor’s objective is to deliver punishments to guilty defendants, while minimizing
the mistake of punishing innocent defendants. To achieve this objective, the prosecutor
directly controls the punishment level of the guilty pleas. However, the optimal level
is determined by how it will manipulate jurors’ behavior, because ex-ante punishment
levels are eventually determined by the conviction probabilities in jury trials. In order
3Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) call this “Bargaining in the shadow of the law”.
4We assume that prosecutors may not single-mindedly pursue convictions, ignoring possible convic-
tions of the innocent. We will justify this assumption in Section 2.
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to see this, consider that (1) if the bargain offer is acceptable for the ‘guilty,’ compared
to the jury trial outcome, ‘guilty’ defendants will plead guilty. Jurors subsequently
update their beliefs, reflecting a lower proportion of guilty defendants in jury trial, and
consequently lowering the conviction probabilities. As a result, the bargain offer will
become unacceptable for ‘guilty’ defendants. (2) If the bargain offer is unacceptable,
the opposite story follows. As the jurors believe that a higher proportion of defendants
who come to trial are guilty, the jurors tend to increase their probability of voting for
conviction. When this occurs, the bargain offer may become acceptable for the guilty. (3)
In general, receiving a guilty plea punishment and undergoing a jury trial will become
indifferent for the ‘guilty’. (4) Meanwhile, the innocent will not plead guilty because
they are less likely be convicted in trial than the guilty, and the guilty are indifferent
between pleading guilty and undergoing a jury trial. Thus, the ex-ante punishment for
the innocent is also determined by the conviction probability in a jury trial.
Therefore, the prosecutor wants to manipulate jurors’ behavior to render the ideal
levels of conviction probabilities. The prosecutor cannot force a certain voting behavior
to jurors, and their voting behavior will follow an equilibrium behavior. Under this
restriction, the ideal jurors’ voting behavior will be induced when the jurors’ preferences
coincide with the prosecutor’s preferences. From this observation, the prosecutor controls
the proportion of guilty defendants going to jury trials, such that jurors’ preferences
combined with the distorted proportion coincide with the prosecutors’ preference. For
instance, as the prosecutor increasingly lowers the guilty plea charge, a higher proportion
of guilty defendants plead guilty, and a defendant in a jury trial is more likely to be
innocent. Then jurors are more careful when voting to avoid mistakes of convicting
the innocent. This manipulated jurors’ behavior fits into the prosecutor’s preference,
when the prosecutor cares more than jurors about mistakenly delivering punishments
to innocent defendants. However, such manipulation is possible only in one direction:
manipulating jurors to vote more for acquittal. Because the guilty are more likely to
take the bargain offer, plea bargaining can only decrease the proportion of the guilty
defendants, When the prosecutor cares less about convicting the innocent, and is more
averse about acquitting the guilty, plea bargaining is useless in manipulating the jurors’
behavior.
Having a combined model of plea bargaining and a jury trial, we can re-interpret
implications of the strategic voting literature. As an example, we revisit the comparison
of two voting rules, unanimity and non-unanimity, which is studied in Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998). Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that the unanimity is inferior in
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terms of the probabilities of convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty. Under the
unanimity, the probabilities do not vanish as the number of jurors grows; whereas, the
probabilities vanish under any non-unanimous rule. Here, the convergence results only
rely on the voting rules, and the jurors’ preferences determine the convergence speeds.
One observation in the previous paragraph is that jurors’ voting behavior resembles the
voting behavior in the strategic voting model without plea bargaining, though preferences
may differ. Therefore, with respect to ex-ante delivering punishment of the entire judicial
process, inferiority of the unanimity persists in the addition of plea bargaining to the
model.
Lastly, this paper sheds light on an economic justification of plea bargaining, signaling,
which is not motivated by saving trial costs.5 Indeed, we assume that a trial costs nothing;
not only are explicit costs such as time and efforts excluded, but all players are also
assumed to be risk neutral. (They are unafraid of uncertainty in trial outcomes.) In this
sense, the model is very much like a signaling game. Given the punishment for a guilty
plea, a defendant, as a sender, signals his true type by pleading either guilty or not guilty.
Afterwords the jurors, as receivers, update their beliefs on the sender’s type and determine
conviction probabilities. In the prosecutor’s viewpoint, plea bargaining allows the court
to screen out some guilty defendants before going to a jury trial. Since the accused know
whether they are guilty, plea bargaining serves as a self-selection mechanism. As such, it
may contribute to the accuracy of the jury trial, on which the entire court performance
hinges.
1.2 Related Literature
The related literature can be divided into those two groups: the first group analyzes
strategic voting behavior in a jury trial; the second studies either plea bargaining itself
or interactions between plea bargaining and jury trials, but without a formal model of
jury trials.
A study on collective decision-making under uncertainty is motivated by the Con-
dorcet jury theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Assuming two possible true states, Condorcet
models a situation in which a group of people, each of whom is imperfectly and privately
informed about the true state, makes a decision by voting for one alternative. Although
the members have a common interest in choosing the true state, imperfect private infor-
5We do not consider the legal justification of plea bargaining.
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mation generates conflict of interests at the time of voting. The theorem says that the
group can more efficiently aggregate private information with simple majority rule than
if each member acts alone.
The Condorcet jury theorem assumes that each juror votes by following her private in-
formation, but recent research illustrates that such action is not consistent with Bayesian
Nash equilibrium behavior (Austen-Smith and Banks (1996); Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996)). The basic intuition departs from the fact that a vote affects a group decision
only when the juror is pivotal. A strategic juror incorporates this fact in her voting de-
cision and votes by assuming that she is pivotal. Even when private information is more
likely from a certain true state, there are cases where her pivotal state convinces her to
follow other jurors’ votes against her private information. This strategic voting behav-
ior is evidenced by experimental studies (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000);
Goeree and Yariv (2010)).
Motivated by the strategic voting hypothesis, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) apply
the model to a criminal court trial. One of the main findings is the inferiority of the
unanimity rule; as the number of jurors grows, the probabilities of convicting the innocent
and acquitting the guilty do not vanish under unanimity; whereas, those probabilities
converge to zero under all non-unanimous rules. Coughlan (2000) extends the case to
mistrial or limited communication among the jurors, and illustrates somewhat divergent
results. He points out that a disagreement under unanimity does not automatically
yield an acquittal, but rather a mistrial. If a mistrial always results in a new trial, the
probability of trial errors is minimized under the unanimity rule. Moreover, assuming
that jurors can reveal private signals before the final decision, if sincere revelation and
sincere voting behavior is an equilibrium behavior under a non-unanimous rule, they are
also in equilibrium under unanimity. Therefore, the unanimity rule may not be inferior.
Our research departs from these papers by including plea bargaining. While the previous
literature contemplates the consequences of various voting rules in the context of a jury
trial, we study the outcomes in the entire judicial process, including both plea bargaining
and a jury trial. We find that the addition of plea bargaining to the model preserves the
inferiority of the unanimous jury trial rule.
Separately from plea bargaining, jury deliberation is another process known to pre-
serve the inferiority of unanimity voting. Interpreting jury deliberation as a Bayesian
communication game, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2003) and Gerardi and Yariv (2007)
find that with jury deliberation, the inferiority of unanimity persists and non-unanimous
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voting rules generate the same set of equilibrium outcomes. That is, as long as a voting
rule is non-unanimous, an exact voting rule is not crucial in the final decision. An exper-
imental study by Goeree and Yariv (2010) confirms that jury deliberation significantly
diminishes the differences of various voting mechanisms in their equilibrium outcomes.
Our study generalizes the strategic voting model beyond the jury trial to the crim-
inal court process. In the strategic voting literature, it is conventional to assume that
litigation is exogenously given. However, when defendants and prosecutors actively par-
ticipate in pre-trial stages, the implications of the strategic voting model may not be
directly applicable to the entire court process. By attaching a model on plea bargaining
to the strategic voting model, we show that the model can be neatly extended to cover
the complete judicial process.
Most literature on plea bargaining approaches the process via a ‘bargaining’ model.
A jury trial contains explicit costs, time, and effort; if participants in a plea bargain
do not want to bear additional risks, uncertainty in trial outcome is an additional cost.
Given such costs, participants in the plea bargain can share a surplus if they reach an
agreement. This surplus division is a ‘bargaining’ problem. A typical model allows
either a prosecutor, a defendant, or both to make bargaining offers. Prosecutors know
the seriousness of the crime, while the defendant knows whether he is guilty. For a brief
summary on this topic, see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989).
It is undeniable that plea bargaining initially originated as a way of avoiding jury
trial costs. However, what we focus on in this paper is the process’s welfare effects due
to factors other than trial costs, a subject that has received less attention. Grossman
and Katz (1983) show that the plea bargain serves as an insurance and screening de-
vice. In the former role, it protects the innocent and society against cases where a trial
process produces incorrect findings and delivers severe punishments. Although innocent
defendants may falsely plead guilty due to the threat of conviction, the sentence will be
lenient in such cases. In the latter role, plea bargains sort the guilty and innocent like
a self-selection mechanism. Since the mechanism ensures that violators of the law are
indeed punished, it may contribute to the accuracy of the legal system. The first role is
irrelevant to our model, since we assume that prosecutors and defendants are risk neutral,
and consequently need no insurance. The second role shares the same motivation as ours.
A major difference from our paper is that Grossman and Katz (1983) lack interactions
between plea bargaining and a jury trial. They assume that plea bargaining is a screen
device affecting, but never being affected by, the jury trial.
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While previous literature studied either plea bargaining assuming an exogenously
given trial behavior, or a jury trial assuming an exogenous litigation process, our model
allows the plea bargaining and jury trial processes to influence each other in a unified
model. In terms of such interaction, Priest and Klein (1984) is one of the studies closest to
our paper, because they clarify the relationship between litigation behavior and jurors’
behavior in the jury trial. The set of disputes settled and the set litigated are not
necessarily the same. Their important assumption is that the potential litigants produce
rational estimates of the likely decision by affecting the belief of the jurors. As in our
paper, Priest and Klein consider interactions between the pre-trial process and the jury
trial. However, while Priest and Klein informally model how biased jurors’ beliefs affect
the jury decision, we explicitly capture the dynamic by employing a strategic voting
model.
2 The Model
A criminal court process begins with a prosecutor indicting a suspect. We assume that
the defendant is either guilty (G) or innocent (I), which occur with equal probabilities.
1. Plea Bargaining:
The prosecutor makes a take-it-or-leave-it plea bargain offer with θ ∈ [0, 1] propor-
tion of the original charge. The defendant can plead either guilty or not guilty. If
the defendant pleads guilty, the case terminates and the θ proportion of the original
punishment is delivered. Otherwise, the plea bargain is withdrawn, and the case
goes to a jury trial. A plea bargain gives the defendant an opportunity to avoid
the judgment of conviction.
2. A Jury Trial:
Our jury model is based on a strategic voting hypothesis in Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1998). A jury consists of n(n > 1) jurors and a voting rule kˆ(0 < kˆ ≤ n).
During the trial, each juror interprets testimony by the witnesses. We follow much
of the strategic voting literature and describe this interpretation by stating that
each juror receives a private signal g or i, which is positively correlated with the
true states, as given by
Pr[g|G] = Pr[i|I] = p, Pr[i|G] = Pr[g|I] = 1− p (1)
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where p ∈ (.5, 1); a juror has a probability p of receiving a correct signal, and a
probability 1− p of receiving an incorrect signal.
The jury reaches a decision by casting votes simultaneously. Each juror can vote
for either conviction or acquittal. If the number of conviction votes is larger than
the voting rule kˆ, the defendant is convicted (C). Otherwise, the defendant is
acquitted (A). The punishment accompanied by C and A are normalized by 1 and
0 respectively. (Consequently, the punishment by pleading guilty becomes θ.)
Our model assumes that all players behave rationally, where each acts to maximize
an appropriately defined utility function. The defendant’s utility changes negatively by
the amount of punishment; −1 if he is convicted, 0 if he is acquitted, and −θ if he pleads
guilty. He is assumed to be risk neutral; if he perceives that he will be convicted with
probability s, then the ex ante utility of going to trial is s · 1+ (1− s) · 0. The defendant
wants to minimize punishment and thus maximize his expected utility.
All jurors have identical preferences. We normalize the preferences so that correct
judicial decisions incur no utility gains or losses: u[C|G] = u[A|I] = 0. Given this
normalization, convicting innocent or acquitting guilty defendants incur utility losses,
u[C|I] = −q and u[A|G] = −(1− q), respectively where q ∈ [.5, 1). We term q as “a level
of reasonable doubt.” 6 7
Finally, we assume that the prosecutor has a preference defined on [0, 1] × {G, I}.
Much like the jurors’ utilities, when punishment h ∈ [0, 1] is delivered to a defendant,
the prosecutor’s utility is given by
v[h|I] = −q′ h , v[h|G] = −(1− q′)(1− h)
where q′ ∈ [0, 1]. Prosecutors lose utility if the innocent are punished or the guilty avoid
their just punishment. 8
6Suppose that a juror believes that the defendant is guilty with probability q˜. The expected utility
from a guilty verdict, −q(1− q˜), is greater than or equal to the expected utility of an innocent verdict,
−(1 − q)q˜, if and only if q˜ ≥ q. Therefore, when jurors vote for conviction, they use q as the threshold
degree of belief that the defendant is guilty. In this respect, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) term q
“the threshold level of reasonable doubt.”
7If q < 0.5, we need additional technical conditions to ensure jurors are more likely to vote for
conviction when they receive signal g. Even in such case, the analysis in this paper is qualitatively
intact.
8We may alternatively assume a self-interested prosecutor, who seeks to deliver as much punishment
as possible or the highest probability of conviction. However in practice, mistakenly managed cases
may later become public, and such exposure will affect a prosecutor’s future career. Thus, even a self-
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Defendant pleads
Jurors receive g or i
Vote with voting rule kˆ
Convict Acquit
Deliver θ
P [C|G], P [C|I]
Guilty
Not Guilty
Compare with θ
Consider
Figure 1: A Criminal Court Process.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model. (1) A prosecutor offers θ as a lesser
sentence in a plea bargain. (2) The defendant pleads either guilty or not guilty. (3) If
the defendant pleads guilty, a judge respects the bargain, and pronounces sentence θ,
and the case terminates. If the defendant pleads not guilty, the case goes to a jury trial.
(4) The jury determines whether to convict or acquit. Blue and solid lines in Figure 1
capture how actions at early stages affect actions at later stages; red and dashed lines
represent how anticipated outcomes of later stages affect actions at early stages.
3 Jury Trial
Let pi denote the jurors’ belief in the probability that a defendant is guilty conditioned
that the case goes to trial. We assume that a guilty defendant is less likely to go to
trial than an innocent are (pi ≤ .5). This assumption is innocuous, because the guilty
defendant is more likely to send a guilty signal g, and each juror is more likely to vote
interested prosecutor will be concerned with false prosecutions. We represent this concern with flawed
cases with a parameterized weight, q′.
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for a conviction when she receives a signal g.9 Thus the guilty have a higher chance of
being convicted. As defendants anticipate such jury behavior, the guilty tend to plead
guilty, and are therefore less likely to go to trial, relative to the innocent.
A pair (σjg, σ
j
i ) in [0, 1] × [0, 1] represents a strategy of juror j. Juror j votes for
conviction with probability σjg when she receives a signal g, and she votes for conviction
with probability σji if the signal is i. We consider symmetric equilibrium voting behavior
in which all jurors adopt the same strategy, and denote a symmetric strategy profile
as (σg, σi), without specifying a particular juror. Since the jury trial is modeled as a
symmetric game, there exists at least one symmetric equilibrium voting behavior (see
Appendix A).10
We then find a symmetric voting behavior which gives all jurors the highest expected
coordinated payoff. Since all jurors have the same preference for judicial decisions, par-
ticularly when convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty, this is a natural way
of refining the symmetric voting behavior. We call this refined behavior an efficient
symmetric voting behavior, or more succinctly an efficient voting behavior.
A rational juror understands that her vote affects the verdict only when she is piv-
otal.11 She takes into account not only the private signal (g or i), but also additional
information from the event of being pivotal (piv), as evidence of guilt. The juror also
knows that defendants in a trial could have pleaded guilty. Thus, the jurors’ belief in the
probability that a defendant on a trial is guilty (pi) also affects her voting behavior.
Let P [G|piv, g, pi] denote the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty, con-
ditional on receiving signal g and being pivotal:
Pr[G|piv, g, pi] =
pi · p · Pr[piv|G]
pi · p · Pr[piv|G] + (1− pi) · (1− p) · Pr[piv|I]
Convicting the defendant changes her expected utility by −q · Pr[I|piv, g, pi], and
acquitting changes her utility by −(1 − q) · Pr[G|piv, g, pi]. Given all the information
available, Pr[G|piv, g, pi] > q indicates that evidence of guilt is clear enough to exceed
9We formally prove this in subsequent paragraphs.
10The existence of symmetric equilibrium voting behavior follows very much like the result that a
symmetric finite normal form game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. We leave the formal proof to
Appendix A.
11Whether a juror is pivotal or not, of course, depends not only on how the other jurors vote but also
on the voting rule - unanimity, simple majority, three-fourths, etc.
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the level of reasonable doubt (q). The optimal outcome from the juror’s viewpoint is to
convict; a rational juror will therefore vote for conviction. Whereas, Pr[G|piv, g, pi] < q
indicates that the optimal outcome for the juror is to acquit; a rational juror will vote
for acquittal.
Rational jurors will vote by comparing
Pr[G | piv, g, pi ]
Pr[ I | piv, g, pi ]
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is g,
By expanding the above expression, we obtain the following voting criterion for a
juror receiving signal g.
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
p
1− p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is g. (2)
A similar argument applied to a juror receiving signal i, and we obtain
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
1− p
p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is i. (3)
The left hand side (LHS) is the likelihood ratio of guilty to innocent, given that a
juror is pivotal, multiplied by the likelihood ratio of private information (g or i), times
the ratio of belief about the defendant’s type; the right hand side (RHS) is the ratio of
reasonable doubt. If the LHS is larger than the RHS in equation (2), a juror receiving
a private signal g has an incentive to vote for conviction; similarly, if the LHS is larger
than the RHS in equation (3), a juror receiving a private signal i has an incentive to vote
for conviction.
To state the probabilities of being pivotal precisely, let rG denote the probability of
voting for conviction when the defendant is guilty, and rI be the same probability when
the defendant is, instead, innocent. Since a guilty defendant and an innocent defendant
send the signal g with probability p and 1− p respectively, we obtain
rG = pσg + (1− p)σi, rI = (1− p)σg + pσi. (4)
When a voting rule requires kˆ (1 ≤ kˆ ≤ n) number of conviction votes for a guilty
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verdict, a juror becomes pivotal when kˆ − 1 other jurors vote for conviction. Assuming
that 0 < rI < 1, voting criterion (2) becomes
12
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
p
1− p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is g, (5)
and criterion (3) becomes
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
1− p
p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is i. (6)
The above expressions give key intuitions behind the equilibrium restrictions of jurors’
behavior in the jury trial. First, the probability of voting for conviction is non-decreasing
in the degree of belief pi. This is straightforward from the fact that the LHS of both
criteria are increasing in pi. Second, jurors are more likely to vote for conviction if the
defendant is guilty (rG > rI). Since the LHS of the former criterion is strictly larger than
the LHS of the latter criterion, a juror receiving signal g has a greater probability of voting
for conviction than a juror receiving a signal i (σg > σi). Also, a guilty defendant has a
higher chance of sending signal g than an innocent defendant, who is more likely to send
signal i. Therefore, when a trial has a guilty defendant, jurors tend to vote for conviction
(rG > rI). Third, as the voting rule requires more conviction votes, jurors are more
likely to cast conviction votes: the strategy σg and σi are non-decreasing in kˆ. Suppose
that a strategy profile (σg, σi) is an equilibrium behavior at pi with kˆ. Considering that
the LHS of both voting criteria are increasing in kˆ, the pair (σg, σi) can be equilibrium
voting behavior with a belief pi′ (pi′ < pi) when the voting rule requires conviction votes kˆ′
(kˆ′ > kˆ). Equilibrium voting behavior at pi with kˆ′ is then higher than (σg, σi), because
voting behavior is non-decreasing in pi.
The equilibrium voting behavior is derived from the voting criteria. Suppose jurors
vote for conviction with probabilities of rI and rG, where 0 < rI < rG < 1. That is, jurors
do not always vote for acquittal (rG > rI > 0) and do not always vote for conviction
(rI < rG < 1). Since σg > σi, three cases of strategies are consistent with such jury
behavior: (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), and (σg = 1, σi = 0).
12When rI = 0 or rI = 1, (5) and (6) are not defined. In Appendix B, we treat these cases separately
when we find equilibrium voting behavior.
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When jurors receiving signal g use a mixed strategy (the first case), they necessarily
have equal preferences on conviction and acquittal. In such instance, the voting criterion
with signal g holds with equality, from which we obtain σg and consistent levels of pi.
When a juror receiving signal i uses a mixed strategy (the second case), we obtain σi
from the equality of voting criterion with signal i. If jurors receiving a signal g vote for
conviction and with signal i vote for acquittal (the third case), the juror receiving guilty
signal has enough evidence to vote for conviction; whereas, a juror receiving an innocent
signal lacks evidence, and thus votes for acquittal. The corresponding inequalities of
voting criteria allows us to find the range of pi consistent with such strategy profile.
We state the jury behavior in Proposition 1, and relegate details of computing equi-
librium voting behavior to Appendix B. It is convenient to introduce a function p¯i defined
as
p¯i(l ; p, q) :=
1
1−q
q
(
p
1−p
)l
+ 1
, ∀l ∈ N
which we can rearrange and obtain
(
p
1− p
)l
p¯i(l)
1− p¯i(l)
=
q
1− q
. (7)
The above equation gives an intuition of which the function p¯i is defined. The equation
is closely related to the voting criteria: p¯i maps a number of guilty signals (l) to the degree
of belief (pi), which gives the minimum amount of evidence for a conviction vote. In other
words, if a jury has only a single juror who receives multiple signals, p¯i(l) is the threshold
level of the juror’s belief such that once the juror gathers l number of guilty signals, the
juror votes for conviction.
With the function p¯i, we can intuitively find the range of belief pi consistent with
different strategies, (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), and (σg = 1, σi = 0). For
instance, given a voting rule requiring kˆ number of conviction votes, (σg = 1, σi = 0) is
not an equilibrium behavior for pi < p¯i(2kˆ−n). To see this, suppose that a juror receives
signal g and she turns out to be pivotal; kˆ− 1 other jurors vote for conviction and n− kˆ
jurors vote for acquittal. Considering that jurors act (σg = 1, σi = 0), kˆ − 1 conviction
votes indicate the same number of guilty signals, and n− kˆ acquittal votes indicate the
same number of innocent signals. Thus, being pivotal is equivalent to observing 2kˆ−n+1
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guilty signals, which results in 2kˆ−n guilty signals combined with the juror’s own guilty
signal. When pi < p¯i(2kˆ− n), 2kˆ− n guilty signals provides insufficient evidence of guilt.
Thus (σg = 1, σi = 0) must not be an equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium voting behavior in a jury trial. We say a
voting behavior is reponsive if the conviction probability with signal g is strictly higher
than the probability with signal i. We show that responsive voting is an equilibrium
behavior if the beliefs are above a certain threshold level. Intuitively, if responsive voting
behavior exists, it must be more efficient than non-responsive behavior, because jurors
use the private signals in their voting decisions. We confirm that if a responsive voting
equilibrium exists, it must be the most efficient voting behavior. Moreover, the conviction
probability for the guilty is higher than for the innocent, and the conviction probabilities
are non-decreasing in pi. This is because guilty and innocent signals are positively corre-
lated with defendants’ true types; thus, the conviction probabilities inherit the properties
of conviction voting probabilities of each signal g or i.
Proposition 1 jurors’ behavior in the jury trial
1. If pi ≥ p¯i(kˆ), then the efficient voting behavior is responsive. Otherwise, the only
symmetric voting behavior (which is also efficient) is the one in which no juror
votes for conviction.
2. An efficient equilibrium voting behavior (σg, σi) is non-decreasing in pi and kˆ, and
σg ≥ σi.
3. Let {(PG, PI)|pi} denote the pair of conviction probabilities of the guilty or the inno-
cent, respectively. Convicting the guilty is more likely than convicting the innocent:
PG ≥ PI for all pi.
4. Let fG(pi) = {P
′
G| ∃P
′
I , (P
′
G, P
′
I) ∈ {(PG, PI)| pi}} and fI(pi) = {P
′
I | ∃P
′
G, (P
′
G, P
′
I) ∈
{(PG, PI)| pi}}: correspondences from pi to the conviction probabilities of the guilty
and the innocent, respectively. Both correspondences are non-decreasing in pi:
fG(pi) ≥ fG(pi
′) and fI(pi) ≥ fI(pi
′) for all pi > pi′. 13 14
13If a real number a is an upper bound of B ⊂ R, we denote a ≥ B. If every a ∈ A is an upper bound
of B ⊂ R, we denote A ≥ B.
14The conviction probabilities, (PG, PI), are determined by a voting rule kˆ, as well as a voting behavior
(σg, σi). Therefore, even though σg and σi are non-decreasing in kˆ, the conviction probabilities may not
be increasing in kˆ, because the threshold number of conviction votes also increases.
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(b) The Unanimity Rule (kˆ = 12).
Figure 2: Efficient symmetric voting behavior with n = 12, p = 6
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, and q = 1
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(b) The Unanimity Rule (kˆ = 12).
Figure 3: Conviction probabilities with n = 12, p = 6
10
, and q = 1
2
Figure 2 depicts the efficient voting behavior under a non-unanimous rule (0 < kˆ < n)
and the unanimity rule (kˆ = n) with some parameter values. Red and solid lines represent
the probability of voting for conviction with signal g; blue and dashed lines represent the
probability of voting for conviction with signal i. Mostly, we have a unique efficient
equilibrium voting behavior, except when pi = pi(kˆ) = pi(n) under the unanimity rule.
The corresponding conviction probabilities are described in Figure 3. Red and solid
lines show the conviction probabilities if the defendant is truly guilty; blue and dashed
lines show the conviction probabilities of the innocent. Again, we certify that conviction
probabilities inherit the properties of conviction voting probabilities: the guilty has a
higher chance of being convicted and the conviction probabilities are non-decreasing in
pi.
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4 Plea Bargaining
A prosecutor offers the defendant an opportunity to plead guilty and suffer the penalty
θ ∈ [0, 1]. The defendant has two choices: pleading guilty or not guilty. A guilty plea
results in a punishment θ; a not guilty plea sends the case to a jury trial. A guilty
defendant compares θ with the conviction probability of the guilty, which we denote as
PG; an innocent defendant compares θ with the conviction probability of the innocent,
which we denote as PI . If θ is larger than PG, no guilty defendant pleads guilty; similarly,
no innocent defendant pleads guilty when θ is larger than PI .
Such pleading decisions presume that defendants know the conviction probabilities
of the guilty or the innocent. We can justify this assumption by stating that they rely
on defense attorneys. In practice, defendants get advice from defense attorneys, who
are aware of whether their previous clients were truly guilty and who can recall the
corresponding judicial decisions.15
Let φG and 1 − φG denote the probability that a guilty defendant pleads guilty or
not guilty, respectively; φI and 1 − φI are defined similarly for an innocent defendant.
Recall that pi denotes the jurors’ beliefs that the defendant is guilty if a case goes to trial.
Unless all cases terminate in guilty pleas (φG > 0 or φI > 0), jurors update their beliefs
pi by the equation
pi =
1− φG
(1− φG) + (1− φI)
. (8)
If all defendants plead guilty, φG = φI = 1, we assume that the jurors update their beliefs
by setting them equal to 0.16
The relationship between the pleading decisions, φG and φI , and the conviction prob-
abilities, PG and PI , captures the main interaction between plea bargaining and jury
trials. One direction, how pleading decisions affect jury behavior, is explicit. The plead-
ing decisions lead jurors to update their beliefs about the guilt of the defendant (updating
pi). As we have shown in the previous section, this belief is taken as a part of the evi-
15It has been observed that participants in plea bargaining foresee the outcomes of jury trials. In this
respect, previous trial decisions significantly influence the parties’ bargaining power. Among others, see
Bibas (2004) and Stuntz (2004)
16Formally, this assumption is equivalent to applying an equilibrium refinement, D1, by Cho and Kreps
(1987). Although the details of the refinement are complicated, the intuition is quite simple. Given that
the innocent are less likely to be convicted, a not guilty plea guarantees higher utility for the innocent
than for the guilty. If a defendant deviates from φG = φI = 1 by pleading not guilty, there is a high
chance that the defendant is innocent. In such a case, it is reasonable to believe that a deviator must
be innocent.
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dence of guilt in jury behavior ({(PC , PI)|pi}). The converse direction, how jury behavior
affects pleading decisions, is implicit. The conviction probabilities are taken into account
in pleading decisions through the defendants’ anticipation (comparing θ vs. PG or θ vs.
PI). Equilibrium behavior ensures that these interactions must be consistent with each
other; the belief pi is consistent with pleading decisions φG and φI , and the anticipated
conviction probabilities are consistent with pi ((PG, PI) ∈ {(P
′
C, P
′
I)|pi}).
Proposition 2 summarizes this equilibrium restriction of the pleading decision and
jurors’ behavior in the jury trial, given a punishment level θ for pleading guilty. In general,
guilty defendants are indifferent between pleading guilty and going to trial (θ = PG), and
the innocent prefer to go to trial (θ ≥ PI).
17 To see why this holds, suppose we have
θ < PG. The guilty will plead guilty, and depending on θ vs. PI , only the innocent
may go to trial. These pleading decisions will lead jurors to believe that all defendants
in trials are innocent, and they will vote for acquittal. The corresponding conviction
probabilities are zero ({(PG, PI)|pi} = {(0, 0)}). Therefore, θ < PG must not be an
outcome of equilibrium behavior. On the other hand, θ > PG can be an equilibrium
behavior only if the prosecutor offers relatively high punishment for pleading guilty. In
that event, all defendants will go to trial, and if the induced conviction probabilities are
still lower than θ, such pleading decisions will be rational.
Proposition 2 Pleading Decision and Jury Trial
Suppose that a prosecutor offers θ as punishment for pleading guilty, and the jury
follows an efficient voting behavior. Either one of the following statements, but not both,
must be true.
• (θ > PG ≥ PI), which leads all defendants to plead not guilty, and all cases go
to jury trial (φG = φI = 0). The updated belief pi is equal to the prior probability
pi0 = .5, and (PG, PI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|.5}.
• The guilty are indifferent between pleading guilty and undergoing a jury trial (θ =
PG); innocent defendants weakly prefer to plead not guilty (θ ≥ PG). These pleading
decisions yield a level of belief pi, which leads the jury to induce the conviction
probabilities of the guilty (PG) such that (PG, PI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|pi} with some PI.
17Lemma 5 In Appendix B.3 show that fG(pi) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-
empty convex values. If the θ is in [0, sup fG(pi = .5)], then by Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists
pi such that θ = PG ∈ fG(pi).
17
The prosecutor wants to offer punishment for pleading guilty of θ yielding his highest
expected equilibrium payoff. Using the equilibrium restrictions on jury behavior and
pleading decisions, the prosecutor’s problem is summarized as the following optimization
problem.
max
θ∈[0,1]
−
1
2
q′
(
φIθ + (1− φI)PI
)
−
1
2
(1− q′)
(
φG(1− θ) + (1− φG)(1− PG)
)
(9)
such that
(a.1) φG ∈ argminφ′∈[0,1] φ
′θ + (1− φ′)PG
(a.2) φI ∈ argminφ′∈[0,1] φ
′θ + (1− φ′)PI
(b) pi =
{
0 if φG = φI = 1
1−φG
(1−φG)+(1−φI )
otherwise.
(c) (PG, PI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|pi}.
The objective function is the prosecutor’s expected utility function. The prosecutor’s
utility is decreased by q′ if the innocent are mistakenly punished. The punishment is
either as a result of a guilty plea, φI θ, or of conviction in jury trial, (1 − φI)PI . When
the guilty go without being fully punished, it also decreases the prosecutor’s utility by
(1 − q′). Such case is either as a result of a guilty plea, φG(1 − θ), or of acquittal in a
jury trial, (1− φG)(1− PG).
The prosecutor anticipates that the defendants will make rational pleading decisions
and the jurors’ behavior will follow equilibrium voting behavior, which restrict the prose-
cutor’s optimization: (a.1) and (a.2) represent pleading decisions by guilty and innocent
defendants, respectively; (b) captures the notion that jurors rationally update their belief
pi to be consistent with pleading decisions; (c) requires that defendants rationally antici-
pate jury behavior, and consequently its conviction probabilities; and {(PG, PI)|pi} in (c)
presumes that jurors will follow the efficient voting behavior.
Solving the prosecutor’s problem requires mathematical techniques, which we leave
to Appendix C, but the motivation behind the prosecutor’s optimal level of θ is quite
intuitive. To illustrate the main idea, we show that the prosecutor is mainly concerned
with how to manipulate the jurors’ belief pi.
For the restrictions in (9), the prosecutor only needs to focus on the second case in
Proposition 2. To see why the second restriction contains the first, suppose that the
second restriction holds in an equilibrium. The punishment following a guilty plea is so
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high that all defendants go to trial. The corresponding prosecutor’s utility can also be
achieved by offering θ = θ¯ where θ¯ := sup fG(.5). Regardless of whether a guilty person
pleads guilty or not guilty, the prosecutor achieves the same utility gain or loss, which
leads to the same utility change in the case of all defendants pleading not guilty.
Using the first equilibrium restriction in Proposition 2, we can simplify the prosecu-
tor’s objective function in (9). Unless θ = 0, we have θ = PG > 0. The efficient voting
behavior becomes responsive (PG > PI), and all innocents go to trial (φI = 1). Then the
prosecutor’s objective function becomes
−
1
2
q′PI −
1
2
(1− q′)(1− PG). (10)
We now see that the prosecutor’s main concern is to manipulate the jurors’ belief pi,
thereby leading to the most preferable jury behavior. One thing to note here is that the
prosecutor is not allowed to force jurors to take a certain voting strategy. That is, he
can at best lead to one of the efficient voting behaviors.
To see how the prosecutor should manipulate the jurors’ belief pi, we revisit the jurors’
voting criteria. We have shown that jurors vote for conviction by comparing
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
p
1− p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is g,
and
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
1− p
p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
if the signal is i,
We can modify the expressions into
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
p
1− p
.5
1− .5
vs
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
if the signal is g,
and
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
1− p
p
.5
1− .5
vs
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
if the signal is i.
The above two versions of the voting criteria lead to the same voting behavior; jurors
receiving signal g (or i) vote for conviction if confronted with the former pair of criteria if
and only if jurors receiving signal g (or i) vote for conviction if confronted with the latter
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pair of criteria. That is, the jury behavior with a belief pi and the ratio of reasonable
doubts q
1−q
is equal to the jury behavior with a belief .5 and the ratio of reasonable doubt
equal to q
1−q
1−pi
pi
. Consequently, we can reinterpret the prosecutor’s effort to manipulate
the jurors’ beliefs as an effort to change the level of the jurors’ reasonable doubt, while
fixing the belief equal to pi0, or .5. The question, “how to manipulate the jurors’ belief”,
is then the same as, “which level of the jurors’ manipulated reasonable doubt is the most
preferable to the prosecutor.”
Intuitively, the prosecutor prefers to have jurors manipulated reasonable doubt to
coincide perfectly with his preference weights on mistakenly delivered or undelivered
punishments: q
′
1−q′
= q
1−q
1−pi
pi
. However, the prosecutor can manipulate the jurors’ rea-
sonable doubt in only one direction; he can only increase the reasonable doubt by inducing
pi ≤ .5. When the jurors, rather than the prosecutor, care about punishing the innocent
(q > q′), the prosecutor has no choice but to induce pi = .5 by offering θ ≥ θ¯. The
following proposition presents the prosecutor’s optimal behavior under an equilibrium
constraint. (The formal proof is in the Appendix D.)
Proposition 3 Equilibrium behavior in the Criminal Court.
1. If q < q′, the prosecutor offers a punishment for pleading guilty such that some guilty
defendants and none of the innocent defendants plead guilty. The jury’s behavior
is the same as the jury behavior of the jury trial model without plea bargaining;
however, the jurors behave as if they have the prosecutor’s preference, q′.
2. If q ≥ q′, the prosecutor offers a harsh punishment for pleading guilty (θ ≥ θ¯), and
all defendants plead not guilty and go to trials. The jury behavior is the same as
the jury behavior of the jury model without plea bargaining.
5 Comparison of Alternative Voting Rules.
As a direct application of Proposition 3, we can re-examine the previous findings from the
jury model. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) find that the unanimity rule is inferior
to non-unanimous rules. As the number of juror gets large, the chance of convicting
the innocent and the chance of acquitting the guilty do not converge to zero under the
unanimous rule; whereas, both converge to zero if the voting rule is non-unanimous.
Assuming that the jury trial employs either the unanimity or a non-unanimous rule, we
reconfirm that the previous results are robust to plea bargaining.
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One of the main conclusions in Proposition 3 is that jury behavior in a criminal court
with plea bargaining is similar to equilibrium behavior in a jury model without plea
bargaining. If q > q′, the behaviors are exactly same; if q ≤ q′, we can mimic the jury
behavior with plea bargaining in a jury model without plea bargaining by assuming that
jurors echo the prosecutor’s preference. Thus, the qualitative findings concerning jury
behavior using unanimous and non-unanimous rules are not changed by plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining only affects quantitative analyses.
Propositions 2 and 3 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) are transformed into Corol-
lary 4. The main theme is preserved, but the limiting values are changed. It is worth
stressing that while the previous literature considers jury trial outcomes, or conviction
probabilities, we treat the outcomes of the entire judicial process: conviction probabilities
and punishment for pleading guilty. Therefore, Corollary 4 compares expected punish-
ments, rather than conviction probabilities, under either the unanimity or non-unanimous
rules.
Corollary 4 The unanimity rule vs. Non-unanimous rules.
Suppose that a criminal court has a plea bargain and a jury trial with n number of
jurors. If the jury requires n votes for conviction, we call the rule unanimity. Otherwise,
the jury requires kˆ = αn (0 < α < 1), and we call the rule non-unanimous.
• If a jury trial uses the unanimity rule, the expected punishment of the guilty con-
verges to 1−
(
(1−q˜)(1−p)
q˜p
)1− p
2p−1
as n→∞, where q˜ = max{q, q′}; for the innocent,
it converges to
(
(1−q˜)(1−p)
q˜p
) p
2p−1
.
• If the jury trial uses a non-unanimous rule with a fixed α, the expected punishment
for the guilty converges to one as n→∞. The expected punishment for the innocent
converges to zero.
6 Conclusion
We study a criminal court process where plea bargaining interacts with jury trial. A
plea bargain is initiated when a prosecutor offers a take-it-or-leave-it guilty pleading
punishment. Then, a guilty or an innocent defendant will choose to plead either guilty
or not guilty. Pleading not guilty is followed by a jury trial in which jurors are assumed
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to follow strategic voting behavior. The strategic voting model allows us to obtain an
explicit dynamic of which pleading decisions affect jurors’ beliefs, thereby influencing their
voting behavior. This dynamic is also applied how defendants anticipate trial outcomes,
with which the defendants compare the guilty plea punishment.
We find that, even if only a proportion of defendants go to jury trial, jury behavior still
takes a fundamental role in the court process. If the prosecutor cares about convicting
the innocent more than jurors do, then the expected degrees of punishment for the guilty
and the innocent in our model are equal to the conviction probabilities of the guilty and
the innocent in the jury model without plea bargaining. If the prosecutor cares about
convicting the innocent less than jurors do, the expected degrees of punishment for the
guilty and the innocent in our model are also equal to the conviction probabilities in the
jury model without plea bargaining, but jurors echo the prosecutor’s preferences. We also
find that the inferiority of the unanimity rule persists in plea bargaining. As the number
of jurors grows, the amount of expected false punishment, or delivering punishment to the
innocent and not delivering it to the guilty, do not vanish under unanimity. In contrast,
they converge to zero under every non-unanimous rule.
This study enlarges the field of strategic voting model beyond the jury trial to the
criminal court system. While most previous studies focus on the trial itself, our paper
suggests that we can obtain the implications of the strategic voting behavior broadly
from the entire court process. In addition, our model provides a framework to study the
economic justification of plea bargaining. We also provide formal dynamics implied in
the previous literature on the interaction between pre-trial and jury trial. Although we
focus on criminal courts, similar motivations are applicable to civil courts with litigation,
committees setting an agenda and voting to pass, or even journal referees, when authors
try their luck in submitting articles.
In this paper, we manage to simplify the model enough to be analytically tractable.
However, this simplification leaves out several interesting issues. An immediate extension
is about a prosecutor who is also informed about the defendant’s type. If he acquires
the information of a defendant, the prosecutor may offer differentiated guilty plea pun-
ishments or sometimes discharge cases. The current model can easily be modified to
ask these questions. However, due to the binary nature of defendants (either guilty or
innocent), the equilibrium analysis yields no interesting implications beyond equilibrium
computations. Once we have a richer model accounting for the intensity of degree of
guilt, the setup with an informed prosecutor would be an interesting research question.
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Appendix A Existence of a symmetric voting
equilibrium.
Let S := {c, a} × {c, a} be the set of pure strategies: ‘c’ represents voting for conviction
and ‘a’ for acquittal. A generic strategy s ∈ S is a pair (sg, si) consisting of voting
decisions with signal g and i. Let Σ := ∆({c, a})×∆({c, a}). A generic mixed strategy
σ = (σg, σi) ∈ Σ consists of probabilities of conviction voting with signal g and i. Define
continuous functions ug(σ
′
g, σ) or ui(σ
′
i, σ) as a juror’s expected utility when she receives
signal g or i respectively and uses strategy σ′, while all other jurors use strategy σ. ug
and ui are continuous in σ
′ and σ.
We proceed similar to the existence proof of Nash equilibrium in Nash (1951). For
each pure strategy s ∈ S, define a continuous function h as
hs(σ) :=
(
max{ 0 , ug(sg, σ)− ug(σg, σ)} , max{ 0 , ui(si, σ)− ui(σi, σ)}
)
.
For each s ∈ S, define a continuous function as
ys(σ) :=
(
σg:sg + h
s
1(σ)
1 +
∑
t∈{c,a} h
t
1(σ)
,
σg:si + h
s
2(σ)
1 +
∑
t∈{c,a} h
t
2(σ)
)
where σg:sg and σg:si are the probabilities that the mixed strategy σ = (σg, σi) assigns to
each pure strategy sg and si.
The set of functions ys(·) ∀s ∈ S defines a mapping from the set of mixed strategy
to itself. Similar to the existence proof of Nash equilibrium, a fixed point of y(·) is a
symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (a symmetric equilibrium voting behavior). Since
the set of mixed strategy is compact and convex, y(·) has a fixed point by the Brouwer
fixed point theorem.
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1
For each level of belief pi, we first find all symmetric equilibrium voting behaviors. Then
we compare the jurors’ expected payoffs and take the most efficient symmetric voting
behavior.
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B.1 Finding all symmetric equilibrium voting behaviors.
B.1.1 Non-responsive equilibrium voting behavior
When kˆ < n, (σg = 1, σi = 1) is an equilibrium voting behavior; given that other jurors
always vote for conviction, a juror is never pivotal. (Her vote never changes the judicial
decisions.) In such case, no juror has an incentive to change her voting strategy from
(σg = 1, σi = 1). Similarly, (σg = 0, σi = 0) is an equilibrium voting behavior when
1 < kˆ.
When kˆ = n, (σg = 1, σi = 1) is not an equilibrium. Given that other jurors always
vote for conviction, being pivotal does not give any additional information. Jurors then
fully rely on their own private signals. If a juror receives innocent signal, then she
compares
1− p
p
pi
1− pi
vs.
q
1− q
.
Note that the evidence innately supports for innocent defendants (1−p
p
< 1 and pi
1−pi
≤
1), and reasonable doubt is in favor of acquittal ( q
1−q
≥ 1). A jurors receiving innocent
signal does not have enough evidence to vote for conviction; σi = 1 is not a best response
to (σg = 1, σi = 1). In a similar fashion, when kˆ = 1, (σg = 0, σi = 0) is an equilibrium
voting behavior only if pi ≤ p¯i(1). Being pivotal does not provide any additional evidence,
and a juror compares her private signal (g or i), belief (pi), and reasonable doubt (q). If
the belief pi is low, even a guilty signal gives insufficient evidence for conviction voting.
B.1.2 Responsive equilibrium voting behavior
A responsive voting strategy has 0 < σg and σi < 1. We define rG and rI as conviction
probabilities of guilty and innocent defendants, computed as
rG = pσg + (1− p)σi, rI = (1− p)σg + pσi
When the jury follows responsive voting behavior, the jury does not always convict
nor acquit defendants (0 < rG, rI < 1). In such case, voting criteria, (5) and (6), are well
defined. For convenience, we reproduce the criteria below.
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rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
p
1− p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
for signal g,
and
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
1− p
p
pi
1− pi
vs
q
1− q
for signal i.
We consider each case of strategy and find necessary levels of belief pi consistent with
the strategy as an equilibrium voting behavior.
Case 1: 0 < σg < 1, σi = 0
Conviction and acquittal must be indifferent to a juror receiving signal g. That is
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
p
1− p
pi
1− pi
=
q
1− q
Substituting in rG = p σg and rI = (1− p) σg, we obtain
(
1− pσg
1− (1− p)σg
)n−kˆ(
p
1− p
)kˆ
pi
1− pi
=
q
1− q
. (11)
Under unanimity (kˆ = n), the first term in LHS is equal to 1, and the equality
holds when pi = p¯i(kˆ) = p¯i(n). Then, any σg ∈ (0, 1) with σi = 0 is an equilibrium
voting behavior.
Consider a non-unanimous voting rule kˆ (kˆ < n). Since 1−pσg
1−(1−p)σg
is strictly de-
creasing in σg, by plugging σg = 0 and σg = 1 in (11), we can check that
p¯i(kˆ) < pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n) is necessary for (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0) to be an equilib-
rium voting behavior. Moreover, at most one value of σg satisfies the equality.
By algebraic manipulation of (11), we find (σg, σi = 0) is an equilibrium voting
strategy with
σg(pi) =
ψ1 − 1
(1− p)ψ1 − p
where ψ1 =
(
1− p
p
) kˆ
n−kˆ
(
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
) 1
n−kˆ
(12)
Case 2: σg = 1, σi = 0
A juror receiving signal g prefers conviction, whereas a juror receiving signal i
prefers acquittal. Substituting in rG = p and rI = 1 − p to voting criteria (5) and
(6), we obtain
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(
p
1− p
)2(kˆ−1)−n
≤
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
≤
(
p
1− p
)2kˆ−n
(13)
The first inequality is from the criterion with signal i, and the second inequality is
from the criterion with signal g. The above inequality is equivalent to p¯i(2kˆ− n) ≤
pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n). When pi is between p¯i(2kˆ−n) and p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n), (σg = 1, σi = 0)
is an equilibrium voting behavior: every juror follows her own signal.
Case 3: σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1
Jurors receiving signal i treat conviction and acquittal equally. That is
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
1− p
p
pi
1− pi
=
q
1− q
Substituting in rG = p+ (1− p)σi and rI = (1− p) + pσi, we get
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
1− pi
pi
=
q
1− q
(14)
Note that p+(1−p)σi
(1−p)+pσi
is strictly decreasing in σi. By plugging in σi = 0 and σi = 1,
we can verify that p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5 is necessary if σg = 1 and 0 < σi < 1
is an equilibrium voting behavior.
For each level of belief pi such that p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n) < pi < .5, at most one σi satisfies
the equality. This σi combined with σg = 1 forms a symmetric equilibrium voting
behavior, and the σi is determined as
σi(pi) =
p− ψ2(1− p)
p ψ2 − (1− p)
where ψ2 =
(
p
1− p
)n−kˆ+1
kˆ−1
(
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
) 1
kˆ−1
(15)
Table 1 summarizes all symmetric equilibrium voting behavior. And Figure 4 illus-
trates equilibrium voting behaviors with n = 12, p = 6
10
, and q = 6
10
, when voting rules
are kˆ = 8 and kˆ = 12. We used solid lines for σg and dashed lines for σi. For each pi,
σg and σi in a strategy profile (σg, σi) share the same color. In this example, we observe
all three equilibrium cases, but we may not observe some cases under other parameter
values. For instance, p¯i(2(kˆ − 1) − n), one of the threshold level of belief, may not be
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Non-unanimous rules The unanimity rule
Non-responsive voting
∀ pi (σg = σi = 1) ∀ pi (σg = σi = 0)
If kˆ > 1, ∀ pi (σg = σi = 0)
Responsive voting
p¯i(kˆ) < pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n) (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0) pi = p¯i(n) (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0)
p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1) − n) (σg = 1, σi = 0) p¯i(n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(n− 2) (σg = 1, σi = 0)
p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5 (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1) p¯i(2n − 2) < pi ≤ .5 (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1)
Table 1: Symmetric voting equilibrium behavior in jury trial.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
þ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ΣHgLΣHiL
(a) A non-unanimous rule (kˆ = 8).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
þ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
ΣHgLΣHiL
(b) The unanimity rule (kˆ = 12).
Figure 4: Symmetric equilibrium voting behavior with n = 12, p = 6
10
, and q = 6
10
defined or may be larger than .5. In such case, (σg = 1, σi = 0) is not an equilibrium
voting behavior for any pi ∈ [0, .5].
B.2 Finding an efficient voting behavior.
For each belief pi, there may be several symmetric equilibrium voting behaviors. If a re-
sponsive voting exists, intuitively it must be more efficient than non-responsive voting, be-
cause jurors essentially use private signals to form judgements. We confirm this intuition
by comparing responsive voting outcomes with non-responsive voting outcomes. If there
is no responsive voting for a pi, then one of the non-responsive equilibria, (σg = 1, σi = 1)
or (σg = 0, σi = 0), is efficient.
Given a belief pi, conviction probabilities (PG, PI) change the jurors’ expected payoff
by
−q · (1− pi) · PI − (1− q) · pi · (1− PG).
The first term corresponds to mistakenly convicting the innocent, and the second term
corresponds to mistakenly acquitting the guilty.
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Between two non-responsive voting behaviors, (σg = σi = 0) and (σg = σi = 1), the
former gives a higher jurors’ expected utility than the latter, because q (1 − pi) is larger
than (1− q) pi.
When pi < p¯i(kˆ), there is no responsive voting behavior, thus (σg = σi = 0) is
the efficient equilibrium voting behavior. When pi ≥ p¯i(kˆ), there is a responsive voting
behavior, and the responsive voting is more efficient than (σg = σi = 0) if and only if the
conviction probabilities (PG, PI) of responsive voting satisfies
−q (1− pi) PI − (1− q) pi (1− PG) > −(1− q) pi
which we can rewrite as
PG
PI
=
∑n
j=kˆ
(
n
j
)
rjG(1− rG)
n−j∑n
j=kˆ
(
n
j
)
rjI(1− rI)
n−j
>
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
. (16)
If the above inequalities hold as equalities, then responsive voting behavior and (σg =
0, σi = 0) are both equally efficient.
We proceed separately with non-unanimous rules and the unanimity rule.
B.2.1 Non-unanimous rules (kˆ < n)
In order to verify (16), first note that k′ > k, rG > rI > 0 implies
rk
′
G (1− rG)
n−k′
rk
′
I (1− rI)
n−k′
>
rkG(1− rG)
n−k
rkI (1− rI)
n−k
. (17)
Also note that
if x, x′ > 0 and y, y′ > 0,
x′
y′
>
x
y
implies
x+ x′
y + y′
>
x
y
. (18)
Sequentially applying (17) to LHS of (16) using (18), we obtain
∑n
j=kˆ
(
n
j
)
rjG(1− rG)
n−j∑n
j=kˆ
(
n
j
)
rjI(1− rI)
n−j
>
rkˆG(1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)
n−kˆ
.
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Therefore, to prove (16), it is enough to show
rkˆG(1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)
n−kˆ
≥
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
. (19)
We proceed with each case of responsive voting behavior.
Case 1: (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), where p¯i(kˆ) < pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n).
By substituting in rG = pσg and rI = (1− p)σg, the LHS of (19) becomes
rkˆG(1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)
n−kˆ
=
(
1− pσg
1− (1− p)σg
)n−kˆ(
p
1− p
)kˆ
.
An equilibrium restriction (11) implies that the RHS of the above expression is
equal to the RHS of (19). Thus (19) holds under equality.
Case 2: (σg = 1, σi = 0), where p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n).
Since rG = p and rI = 1− p, the LHS of (19) is
rkˆG(1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)
n−kˆ
=
(
p
1− p
)2kˆ−n
.
From (13), equation (19) must be true.
Case 3: (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), where p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5.
Note that (14) is a necessary equilibrium restriction. Since pi ≤ .5 and p > .5,
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
=
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
By substituting in rG = p+ (1− p) σi, rI = (1− p) + p σi, we obtain
rkˆG(1− rG)
n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)
n−kˆ
=
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ
≥
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
Inequality (19) is derived from the above two inequalities.
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B.2.2 The unanimity rule (kˆ = n)
If the voting rule follows unanimity, then (16) becomes
PG
PI
=
(
rG
rI
)n
>
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
. (20)
If the above inequality holds, responsive voting is more efficient than (σg = 0, σi = 0);
if LHS and RHS are equal, both responsive and (σg = 0, σi = 0) are equally efficient.
Case 1: (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), where pi = p¯i(n).
By substituting in rG = pσg and rI = (1− p)σg, the LHS of (20) becomes
(
rG
rI
)n
=
(
p
1− p
)n
.
By definition of p¯i(·) and pi = p¯i(n), (20) holds as an equality. Thus, both (0 < σg <
1, σi = 0) and (σg = 0, σi = 0) are equally efficient.
Case 2: (σg = 1, σi = 0), where p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n).
Since rG = p and rI = 1− p, the LHS of (20) is
(
rG
rI
)n
=
(
p
1− p
)n
.
By definition of p¯i(·), (20) holds as an equality when pi = p¯i(2kˆ−n) = p¯i(n); otherwise
if p¯i(n) < pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) then (20) holds with a strict inequality. Thus, when
pi = p¯i(n), both (σg = 1, σi = 0) and (σg = 0, σi = 0) are equally efficient; when
p¯i(n) < pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n), responsive voting (σg = 1, σi = 0) is the most efficient.
Case 3: (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), where p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5.
By substituting in rG = p+ (1− p) σi, rI = (1− p) + p σi, we obtain
(
rG
rI
)n
=
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)n
>
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)n−1
p
1− p
=
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
where the last equality is from the voting criterion (14). Responsive voting is the
most efficient.
30
B.3 Proof of each item in Proposition 1.
We have shown that there exists a responsive equilibrium voting behavior if the belief
pi is no less than p¯i(kˆ). Moreover, responsive voting yields the highest jurors’ expected
utility (Item 1).18
From the closed form solution of responsive voting behavior, we observe that σg and
σi are constant on [0, p¯i(kˆ)] and [p¯i(2kˆ − n), p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n)], and non-decreasing in pi on
each intervals (p¯i(kˆ), p¯i(2kˆ − n)) and (p¯i(2kˆ − n), .5]. By comparing across the intervals,
we can also check that σg and σi are non-decreasing in pi over [0, .5] (Item 2).
For a level of belief pi, the conviction probabilities of the guilty and the innocent,
{(PG, PI)|pi}, are determined by
PG =
n∑
k′=kˆ
(
n
k′
)
rk
′
G (1− rG)
n−k′
PI =
n∑
k′=kˆ
(
n
k′
)
rk
′
I (1− rI)
n−k′
where rG = pσg + (1 − p)σi and rI = (1 − p)σg + pσi, where (σg, σi) are the efficient
voting behavior. Note that the conviction probabilities of the guilty and the innocent
are strictly increasing in rG and rI , which are strictly increasing in σg and σi.
Under equilibrium voting, PG ≥ PI clearly holds when the efficient voting behavior
is (σg = 0, σi = 0), since the conviction probabilities are all equal to zero. If the efficient
voting behavior is responsive, we showed that (16) holds and q
1−q
1−pi
pi
≥ 1. Thus, PG ≥ PI
(Item 3).
Moreover, fG(pi) and fI(pi) are non-decreasing in pi, because conviction probabilities
are strictly increasing in σg and σi, and σg and σi are non-decreasing in pi (Item 4).
In addition to the properties in Proposition 1, we obtain the following lemma which
is useful when we later prove Proposition 2. 19
18The only special case is when the voting rule requires unanimity and pi = p¯i(n). Then any voting
behavior of (0 ≤ σg ≤ 1, σi = 0) is efficient.
19The lemma also holds for fI(pi), but we do not need this observation in proving Proposition 2.
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Lemma 5 Conviction probability of the guilty fG(pi) is an upper hemicontinuous corre-
spondence in pi with non-empty convex values.
Proof : Note that the efficient voting behavior σg and σi are unique for every pi, except
when pi = p¯i(n) and the unanimity hold, where σi = 0 and σg can be any in [0, 1].
Since
∑n
k′=kˆ
(
n
k′
)
rk
′
G (1 − rG)
n−k′ is continuous in σg and σi, fG(pi) is a convex valued for
all pi. In addition, closed form solutions of efficient voting behavior (σg and σi) are
upper hemicontinuous in pi. Since fG is continuous in σg and σi, fG(pi) inherits upper
hemicontinuity in pi.
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose we have θ > PG under an equilibrium. No defendant pleads guilty, and the
jurors’ reasonable beliefs pi will be equal to .5. The conviction probabilities (PG, PI)
must be in {(P ′G, P
′
I)|.5} (Item 1).
Otherwise, θ ≤ PG. Note that θ ∈ [0, θ¯] where θ¯ := sup fG(.5). There exists a pi
such that θ = PG ∈ fG(pi), because fG(pi) is upper hemicontinuous in pi with non-empty
convex values (Intermediate Value Theorem). Suppose by a contradiction that θ < PG.
Every guilty defendant pleads guilty, and only the innocent may or may not go to trial.
In such case, jurors reasonably believe that all defendants in trials are innocent (pi = 0),
which consequently leads conviction probability equals to zero. This contradicts θ < PG.
θ = PG must be true (Item 2).
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 3
The prosecutor’s problem is described below.
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max
θ∈[0,1]
−
1
2
q′
(
φIθ + (1− φI)PI
)
−
1
2
(1− q′)
(
φG(1− θ) + (1− φG)(1− PG)
)
(21)
such that
(a.1) φG ∈ argminφ′∈[0,1] φ
′θ + (1− φ′)PG
(a.2) φI ∈ argminφ′∈[0,1] φ
′θ + (1− φ′)PI
(b) pi =
{
0 if φG = φI = 1
1−φG
(1−φG)+(1−φI )
otherwise.
(c) (PG, PI) ∈ {(P
′
C , P
′
I)|pi}.
Using Proposition 2, we simplify the above expressions. To begin with, we can restrict
without a loss of generality that a prosecutor can offer θ ∈ [0, θ¯], because he can obtain
any utility level from offering θ > θ¯ by offering θ = θ¯: all players perceive the same ex-
ante punishment in both cases. In the former case, all defendants plead not guilty and
receive (PG, PI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|pi} conviction probabilities. In the latter case, some guilty
defendants may plead guilty, but the punishment for a guilty plea is equal to conviction
probability, which is the expected punishment from a jury trial. As far as the ex-ante
punishments are same, the prosecutor and the defendant are indifferent pleading guilty
and undergoing jury trial.
Once the prosecutor offers θ ∈ [0, θ¯], the second item in Proposition 2 ensures that θ =
PG ≥ PI . Pleading decisions of the guilty are straightforward: the guilty are indifferent
toward pleading guilty or pleading not guilty, thus any φG ∈ [0, 1] is rational. Pleading
decisions of the innocent depend on θ. PG = PI holds only when θ = PG = PI = 0;
otherwise, θ = PG > PI . In the former case, any pleading decision behavior incurs the
same expected prosecutor’s utility, −1
2
(1− q′), especially when φI = 1 (no punishment).
In the latter case, φI = 1 must be true, since only pleading not guilty is rational. In all,
when the prosecutor offers θ from [0, θ¯], it is innocuous for the prosecutor to assume that
φI = 1. By applying these observations, we simplify the prosecutor’s decision as
max
θ∈[0,θ¯]
−
1
2
q′PI −
1
2
(1− q′)(1− θ)
such that
(a) φG ∈ [0, 1]
(b) pi =
{
0 if φG = 1
1−φG
2−φG
otherwise.
(c) (θ, PI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|pi}.
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We define a function P˜I : [0, θ¯]→ [0, 1] as follows
P˜I(θ) = pI , where ∃ pi, (θ, pI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|pi}.
With referencing the proof of Proposition 1, we verify weather the function P˜I is
well-defined: if the value of P˜I exists and is unique for all pi ∈ [0, θ¯]. There are four
cases: (1) θ = 0, (2) θ ∈ (0, pˆG), (3) θ = pˆG, or (4) θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯], where pˆG is the conviction
probability of the guilty when jurors vote by following their own signals (σg = 1, σi = 0).
If θ = 0, pI must be 0. If θ = pˆG, pI is unique and the value is derived from the
voting strategy (σg = 1, σi = 0). For other cases, recall that the conviction probabilities
are defined as
PG =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkG
(
1− rG
)n−k
, PI =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkI
(
1− rI
)n−k
where rG = pσg + (1 − p)σi and rI = (1 − p)σg + pσi. When θ ∈ (0, pˆG), σi = 0 and
both PG and PI are strictly increasing in σg. Since PG is continuous in rG which is also
continuous in σg, for any θ ∈ (0, pˆG), there exists a unique σg inducing θ = PG. Such
σg combined with σi = 0 gives a unique pI such that (θ, pI) ∈ {(P
′
G, P
′
I)|pi}. A similar
procedure applies when θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯].
Through the above argument, the function P˜I is not only well-defined, but strictly
increasing and continuous on [0, θ¯], and differentiable on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯). Using P˜I ,
the prosecutor’s problem becomes
max
θ∈[0,θ¯]
U(θ) := −
1
2
q′P˜I(θ)−
1
2
(1− q′)(1− θ). (22)
We show that the objective function above is concave. Since P˜I is continuous in θ,
the objective function is, too. Moreover, P˜I is differentiable on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯), and
U(θ) is a linear combination of θ and P˜I . Thus, U(θ) is also differentiable with respect
to θ on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯). If we show that derivatives of P˜I is decreasing on (0, pˆG)
and (pˆG, θ¯), and the left derivate is greater than the right at pˆG, then the concavity of
P˜I follows. Since U(θ) is a linear combination of θ and P˜I , concavity of the objective
function directly follows the concavity of P˜I .
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When θ ∈ (0, pˆG), PG and PI are differentiable with respect to σg. The derivative of
PG is
∂PG
∂σg
=
∂
∂σg
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
(rG)
k(1− rG)
n−k
=
n−1∑
k=kˆ
(
n!
k!(n− k)!
krk−1G (1− rG)
n−kr′G
−
n!
k!(n− k − 1)!
rkG(n− k)(1− rG)
n−k−1r′G
)
+ nrn−1G r
′
G
= n r′G
(
n− 1
kˆ − 1
)
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)
n−kˆ (23)
Using a similar operation, we obtain
∂PI
∂σg
= n r′I
(
n− 1
kˆ − 1
)
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)
n−kˆ (24)
Therefore,
∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
=
∂PI/∂σg
∂PG/∂σg
=
r′I r
kˆ−1
I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
r′G r
kˆ−1
G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
. (25)
Since rG = pσg and rI = (1− p)σg, (25) becomes
(
1− p
p
)kˆ(
1− (1− p)σg
1− pσg
)n−kˆ
. (26)
As θ increases in (0, pˆG), the corresponding σg increases, and the above derivative
strictly decreases. Therefore, ∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
is decreasing in θ ∈ (0, pˆG).
When θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯), σg is fixed equal to 1 and only σi varies. Similar to (23) and (24),
we obtain
∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
=
∂PI/∂σi
∂PG/∂σi
=
r′I r
kˆ−1
I (1− rI)
n−kˆ
r′G r
kˆ−1
G (1− rG)
n−kˆ
. (27)
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By substituting in rG = p+ (1− p)σi and rI = (1− p) + pσi, we obtain
(
(1− p) + pσi
p+ (1− p)σi
)kˆ−1(
p
1− p
)n−kˆ+1
. (28)
Again, as θ increases in (pˆG, θ¯), the corresponding σi increases, and the above deriva-
tive decreases. Therefore, ∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
is decreasing in θ.
Lastly, at θ = pˆG, the left derivative is greater than the right derivative, because
the limit of (26) as σg goes to 1 is greater than the limit of (28) as σi goes to 0. This
concludes that P˜I is strictly concave in θ, and thus the objective function in (22) is also
strictly concave in θ.
Since the prosecutor’s objective function is strictly concave in θ, First Order Condition
(FOC) gives the necessary and sufficient condition of optimizer θ∗. Proposition 3 also
narrates the first order condition. Instead of finding the closed form solution, we study
the FOC. Provided that the optimizer θ∗ falls into,
Interior Solutions
[0 < θ∗ < pˆG]: Using (26), FOC of (22) becomes
(
p
1− p
)kˆ(
1− pσg
1− (1− p)σg
)n−kˆ
=
q′
1− q′
.
Recall that a juror receiving guilty signal uses a mixed strategy in this level of
conviction probability for the guilty. (Equation (12) holds.) We obtain
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
=
q′
1− q′
[pˆG < θ
∗ < θ¯]: Using (28), FOC of (22) becomes
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
=
q′
1− q′
.
Recall that a juror receiving innocent signal uses a mixed strategy in this level of
conviction probability for the guilty. (Equation (15) holds.) We obtain
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q1− q
1− pi
pi
=
q′
1− q′
Boundary Solutions
[θ∗ = pˆG]: The prosecutor offer such punishment for a guilty plea, when
lim
θ↓pˆG
∂U(θ)
∂θ
≤ 0 ≤ lim
θ↑pˆG
∂U(θ)
∂θ
Replacing (26) and (28) for ∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
, we can rewrite the above inequalities as
(
(1− p) + pσi
p+ (1− p)σi
)kˆ−1(
p
1− p
)n−kˆ+1
≤
1− q′
q′
≤
(
1− p
p
)kˆ(
1− (1− p)σg
1− pσg
)n−kˆ
,
or
(
p
1− p
)2(kˆ−1)−n
≤
q′
1− q′
≤
(
p
1− p
)2kˆ−n
Compared with (13), when the prosecutor chooses θ∗ = pˆG, the jurors’ voting
behavior with pi and q is exactly the same as the voting behavior when jurors’
beliefs are equal to .5 and reasonable doubt are equal to q′.
[θ∗ = 0]: The right derivative at θ = 0 must be non-positive. Applying (26) to the
derivative of the objective function in (22) while taking σg → 0, we obtain
(
p
1− p
)kˆ
≤
q′
1− q′
.
Note that such θ∗ induces the equilibrium voting behavior σg = σi = 0. This
strategy profile becomes an efficient voting behavior when the RHS of (11) is greater
than or equal to the LHS, which implies
(
p
1− p
)kˆ
pi
1− pi
≤
q
1− q
.
By comparing the above two inequalities, we observe that the equilibrium voting
behavior is the same as the voting behavior when jurors’ beliefs are equal to .5 and
reasonable doubts are equal to q′.
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[θ∗ = θ¯]: The left derivative at θ = θ¯ must be non-negative. Applying (28) to the
derivative of U(θ), we must obtain
lim
θ↑θ¯
∂U(θ)
∂θ
≥ 0
or
(
p + (1− p)σ¯i
(1− p) + pσ¯i
)kˆ−1(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
≥
q′
1− q′
where σ¯i with σg = 1 is an equilibrium voting behavior with the belief pi = .5.
Note that in this situation, a juror receiving an innocent signal is indifferent between
conviction and acquittal. Thus (14) becomes
(
p+ (1− p)σ¯i
(1− p) + pσ¯i
)kˆ−1(
1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
=
q
1− q
.
Thus, q
1−q
≥ q
′
1−q′
, or q ≥ q′.
When q ≥ q′, the prosecutor offers θ∗ = θ¯, and all defendants plead not guilty (pi =
.5). Jurors vote with threshold q
1−q
, which is the same as the threshold in jury model
without plea bargaining. Although we have restricted the prosecutor’s strategy
space to [0, θ¯], any θ∗ higher than θ¯ induces the same prosecutor’s equilibrium
expected utility as θ∗ = θ¯.
Appendix E Proof of Corollary 4
First, note that efficient voting behavior is responsive if pi > p¯i(kˆ). Since p¯i(l) is strictly
decreasing in l, the efficient voting behaviors are responsive for all pi > 0 as n→∞.
Given pi, p, and unanimity (kˆ = n), the efficient voting leads the conviction prob-
abilities to converge to 1 −
(
(1−q)(1−p)pi
qp(1−pi)
)1− p
2p−1
for the guilty, and to
(
(1−q)(1−p)pi
qp(1−pi)
) p
2p−1
for the innocent. These convergence results directly follow Proposition 2 in Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998). (Our parameter values satisfy all conditions assumed in their
Proposition.)
For non-unanimous rules, regardless of the jury size n, we have pi
1−pi
= 1 (if q > q′)
or 1−q
q
pi
1−pi
= 1−q
′
q′
(if q ≤ q′). As we replace 1−q
q
pi
1−pi
= 1−q˜
q˜
where q˜ = max{q, q′}, the
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conviction probabilities for the guilty and the innocent directly follow Proposition 3 in
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998): conviction probability for the guilty converges to 1
and for the innocent converges to 0.
Lastly from Proposition 2, we can relate the ex-ante punishments, one for the guilty
and another for the innocent, to the conviction probabilities in jury trials.
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